1. Journalists And The Media Seem
To Believe That Their Free Speech Should Be Given Special Protection Because
Whatever They Publish Is In The Public Interest. Nothing Could Be Further From
The Truth. Discuss.
This study will critically examine the heated debate
and controversial aspects surrounding the principle of the freedom of speech
and the general notion that the press should be granted the freedom of
expression as a result of the public interest argument. The courts have indeed
frequently upheld the public interest argument, though they have also
restricted the ambit of the public interest. The study will demonstrate that
allowing the freedom of speech to prevail as a result of the public interest
argument is not in every case a sound conclusion. Rather, an important
distinction should be made between the private lives of individuals and the
public interest. Ultimately, no general approach has emerged; the courts
instead have adopted a case by case approach to the issue. The courts have
simply attempted to balance in each case the importance of the freedom of
expression and the right to privacy.
Suggested Reading
- Deacon, R, Lipton, N, & Pinker, R
2011. Privacy and Personality Rights: Commercial Exploitation and Protection,
London: Jordan Publishing.
- Klug, F & Starmer, K 2005. 'Standing
back from the Human Rights Act 1998; How Effective is it Five Years On?',
Public Law, vol. 5, no. 12.
- Warren, SD & Brandeis, LD 1890. 'The
Right to Privacy', Harvard Law Review, vol. 4, no. 193.
2. Judicial Review As A Process:
An Argument For Weak Judicial Review.
Judicial review is, quite simply, a powerful
mechanism for monitoring the actions of the legislature and the executive; its
role within the UK governmental system is huge. While the judicial review
process often varies between states, the United Kingdom's procedure places upon
the courts the duty to supervise the exercise of public power upon an
individual's application. Despite, or perhaps because, of its importance, judicial
review has been under close scrutiny since its birth. Some argue that the UK
process is in need of reform, particularly due to the tension it arouses
between the courts and the legislature. This study will compare the two main
models of judicial review; weak and strong judicial review, in order to compose
an argument in favour of the former. A variety of reasons will be proposed to
promote weak judicial review, particularly the need to protect and promote
Parliamentary sovereignty. Although it is necessary for the judiciary to
exercise some degree of control over the legislature, to place too great a
power in the judiciary is equally undesirable.
Suggested Reading
- Waldron, J 2006. 'The Core of the Case
against Judicial Review', Yale Law Journal, vol. 115, no. 6, pp.
1346-1361.
- Tribe, LH 1988. 'Judicial Interpretation
of Statutes: Three Axioms', Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, vol.
11, no. 51.
- Mcleod, I 2003. Legal Theory, 2nd edn,
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Clyde, RHL & Edwards, D 1999. Judicial
Review, London: W. Green.
3. With Particular Reference To
The Opinions Of Lords Bingham, Hope, Steyn And Baroness Hale, Discuss The
Significance Of R (Jackson) V Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 [2006] 1 AC 262
For The Position Of Parliamentary Supremacy (Or Sovereignty) In The Modern
British Constitution.
Perhaps the most widely known definition of
Parliamentary supremacy is that coined by Dicey, which presents the extent of
the powers of Parliament. Yet the concept of Parliamentary supremacy in practice
as opposed to theory has raised many important issues. Perhaps the most
important of those issues was raised in the case of R (Jackson) v Attorney
General in which the validity of the Parliament Act 1949 was questioned.
Although the judges decided that the Act was valid, the differing views offered
by the judges suggest that the courts are yet to completely rule out the rigid
theory of Dicey in favour of the non-orthodox approach. This study will examine
the concept of Parliamentary supremacy in light of recent advancements which
seek to reduce the extent to which it can be deemed supreme. Should the rigid
approach be maintained or is it now necessary to adopt a more flexible and
modernised approach to parliamentary supremacy?
Suggested Reading
- Bradley, AW & Ewing KD 2011.
Constitutional & Administrative Law, 15th edn, Essex: Pearson
Education.
- Carroll, A 2009. Constitutional and
Administrative Law, 5th edn, Essex: Pearson Longman.
- Hilaire, B 2011. Constitutional &
Administrative Law, 8th edn, London: Routledge.
- Forsyth, C 2011. 'The Definition of
Parliament after Jackson: Can the Life of Parliament be Extended under the
Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949?', International Journal of Constitutional
Law, vol. 9, no. 1.
4. It Has Been Recognised For
Centuries That Hard Cases Make Bad Law. At The Same Time It Was Recognised That
Good Law Could Throw Up Hard Cases, Because The Law Deals With The Generality
Of Cases. If An Attempt Is Made To Deal Separately With Every Hard Case That It
Throws Up, There Would Be No Rule Of Law At All. There Would Be Palm-Tree
Justice And A Lurching From One Case To Another, So That The Citizen Would Not
Know Under What Law He Stood" (House Of Lords Debates, 28 September 2000,
Column 987). Discuss.
The UK legal system is a complex conglomeration of
statute, precedent, Parliamentary supremacy, judicial review and a distinct
relationship between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. Despite
the extensive powers of the legislature and the executive, final decisions
provided by the judiciary play an important role in the application of written
statute to actual circumstances. The restriction of judicial decisions to
precedent acts as a limitation on judicial power and ensures that the common
law is consistent and fair. Yet, the task of the judiciary is more complex than
simply applying legal statute; it must convert generality into detail, and
apply it to the facts of any given case. This study will examine the process
adopted by the courts in applying statute and precedent to cases. The concept
of the hard case will be focused upon, to determine whether such cases must be
dealt with differently. It will ultimately be demonstrated that the need to
ascribe to precedent is not always possible as a result of the generality of
written law
Suggested Reading
- Alexander, L & Sherwin, E 2007.
'Judges as Rule Makers' in Edlin, DE (ed.) Common Law Theory. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
- Caenegem, RC van 1986. Judgers,
Legislators & professors: Chapters in European Legal History.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gearey, A; Morrison, W & Jago, R
2009. The Politics of the Common Law: Perspectives, Rights, Processes,
Institutions. Oxon: Routledge-Cavendish.
- Pound, R 1963. The Spirit of the Common
Law. Boston: Beacon Press.
5. Consider The Proposition That
The UK's Constitution Is Not Worth The Paper It Is Not Written On.
It is commonly said that the UK's constitution is
unwritten, or that it is simply non-existent. Depending upon the criteria that
one choses to apply, the question as to whether the UK constitution exists can
be answered in both the positive and the negative. This study will examine the
criteria that can be applied for determining whether or not the UK has a
constitution. This will include the broad, substance�based approach and will necessitate an examination of whether
the UK constitution should be codified in a single document. What are the
advantages and disadvantages of a codified constitution? Would the UK benefit
from such codification? Such taxing questions will be explored, along with an
array of other important issues.
Suggested Reading
- Bradley, AW & Ewing KD 2011.
Constitutional & Administrative Law, 15th edn, Essex: Pearson
Education.
- Carroll, A 2009. Constitutional and
Administrative Law, 5th edn, Essex: Pearson Longman.
- Hilaire, B 2011. Constitutional &
Administrative Law, 8th edn, London: Routledge.
6. Why Should The Dispute
Resolution Function Of Courts Also Have The Effect Of Creating Binding Case Law
For Future Litigants And Generations? What Legitimates The Power Of Judges To
Make Case Law?
The decisions of the judiciary are the product of
various legislative tools which ultimately combine to form the common law.
Perhaps the most important characteristic of the common law system of England
and Wales is the separation of the judiciary and the legislature. Yet many find
it taxing to reconcile this separation in light of the binding nature of
judicial decisions. This study will critically explore the UK's legal system in
a bid to discover which principles serve to legitimise the power of judges to
form binding decisions. Is the judiciary ultimately unfettered or do mechanisms
exist which limit its power both in practice as well as in theory? The process
of applying written statute to real situations will be examined in order to
discover the extent of judicial powers when making decisions.
Suggested Reading
- Alexander, L & Sherwin, E 2007.
'Judges as Rule Makers' in Edlin, DE (ed.) Common Law Theory, New York:
Cambridge University Press.
- Friedmann, W 1959. Law in a Changing
Society, London: Stevens & Sons.
- Gearey, A, Morrison, W & Jago, R
2009. The Politics of the Common Law: Perspectives, Rights, Processes,
Institutions, Oxon: Routledge-Cavendish.
- Hart, HM; Sacks, AM & Eskridge, WN
1994. The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of
Law, New York: Foundation Press.
7. The Question Whether Or Not
The Defence Of Consent Should Be Extended To Sadomasochistic Activities Can
Only Be Decided By Consideration Of Public Policy And Public Interest (Lord
Templeman In R V Brown 1993 2 ALL ER 75). Critically Evaluate This Quote By
Lord Templeman Taking Into Account The Extent To Which One Can Consent To Acts
Which Would Otherwise Be Contrary To The Offences Against The Person Act 1861.
The courts have perpetually struggled to merge the
law's stance on consensual harm with the importance of preserving the public
interest and this struggle is highly apparent in case law. Should consensual
harm negate a justification of legal sanction? At which point, if any, may the
law inform us that consent is not sufficient to negate liability? This is
indeed a delicate issue, and begins with the controversial case of R v Brown in
which it was held that consent to sadomasochist harm privately caused between
adults was not sufficient in the interests of public policy. This study will
focus upon the major problems posed by reference to the public interest in
relation to consensual harm. The evident difficulties surrounding the laying of
boundaries as to when consensual harm should be permitted and when it should
not will be critically examined, as well as when the public interest should, if
at all, overcome individual autonomy.
Suggested Reading
- Allen, M 2003. Textbook on Criminal Law,
7th edn., New York: Oxford University Press.
- Devlin, P 1965. The Enforcement of
Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fletcher, GP 2000. Rethinking Criminal
Law, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, G 1962. 'Consent and Public
Policy', Criminal Law Review, vol. 1, no. 74.
8. Critically Explain, Illustrate
And Discuss How The European Court Of Human Rights Has Approached, Defined And
Limited The Concept Of Torture Under Article 3, Looking At The Relevant Case
Law.
The European Court's definition and application of
torture under Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights has
attracted considerable criticism since the Article was first initiated. The
criticisms are understandably harsh, though many recognise the problem of
defining and applying the concept of torture effectively. Article 3 of the ECHR
quite simply states that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". It interestingly is not
subject to exceptions or restrictions, even in a state of war or public emergency.
The absolute nature of the right therefore causes one to conclude that most
forms of inhuman and degrading treatment would be caught within the broad ambit
of the article. This study will critically evaluate the European Court's
approach to Article 3, as reality suggests that the right is not as absolute as
one would assume. This is particularly the case when observing the way in which
torture has been defined.
Suggested Reading
- Janis, MW, Kay, RS & Bradley, AW
2008. European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials, 3rd edn, New York:
Oxford University Press.
- Mowbray, A 2005. 'The Creativity of the
European Court of Human Rights', Human Rights Law Review, vol. 5, no. 1,
pp. 57-79.
- Ovey, C & White, RC 2006. The
European Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn, New York: Oxford University
Press.
- Spjut, RJ 1979. 'Torture Under the
European Convention on Human Rights', American Journal of International
Law, vol. 73, no. 2, pp. 267-272.
9. Human Rights And Their Recent
Demise Under Anti-Terrorism Legislation: Justified Or Unacceptable? The
Conflict Between Civil Liberties And Public Safety.
Anti-terrorism legislation is indeed the new trend;
it alters with the seasons and depends more or less upon current attitudes
towards the apparent threat of terrorism. Consequently, an increasing number of
anti-terrorist measures have been given forceful yet sometimes brief entrance
into UK law. Not less than 5 new anti-terrorist Acts were introduced between
2000 and 2008, each increasing the number of offences that could be caught in the
anti-terrorism net.
This study will examine current anti-terrorism
offences and the extent to which they have gradually eroded individual rights
in the interests of public safety. Anti-terrorism legislation will be
unavoidably criticised, as references to national safety have allowed almost
any measures to be justified. It will be ultimately argued that such
legislation threatens the very public safety it seeks to protect, and that an
increased ascription to individual civil liberties must be pursued.
Suggested Reading
- Amos, M 2006. Human Rights Law, Oxford:
Hart Publishing.
- Fenwick, H 2007. Civil Liberties and
Human Rights, 4th edn, London: Routledge-Cavendish.
- Fenwick, H & Phillipson, G 2011.
Text, Cases and Materials on Public Law and Human Rights, 3rd edn, Oxon:
Routledge.
- Stone, S 2010. Textbook on Civil
Liberties &Human Rights, 8th edn, New York: Oxford University Press.
10. The Law Of Privacy In The UK
Must Take Account Of Practical As Well As Moral Considerations.
The law of privacy in the UK does not exist as a
separate offence from its embodiment in the Human Rights Act 1998. Prior to the
Act, privacy was defined by a traditional value-based approach circling the
principle of free press, which was considered to protect adequately the rights
of individuals. The absence of statute to supplement the law of privacy as
embodied in the HRA 1998 is an interesting topic which will be examined in this
study. Attention will be drawn to other forms of 'privacy' laws such as
defamation. The considerable amount of case law formed by the courts on the
reach and boundaries of privacy will be addressed in an attempt to define when
the privacy of individuals can be infringed and under which circumstances. Can
infringements of privacy be linked to moral and/or practical considerations?
Can equal importance be attached to both moral and practical issues or do the
two conflict to such an extent that one must simply prevail? It will ultimately
be demonstrated that the lack of a separate privacy law is problematic and that
perhaps the time has come to formulate such a law.
Suggested Reading
- Deacon, R, Lipton, N & Pinker, R
2011. Privacy and Personality Rights: Commercial Exploitation and
Protection, London: Jordan Publishing.
- Friedmann, D & Barak-Erez, D 2001.
Human Rights in Private Law, Oregon: Hart.
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